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ALD-071        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-2989 
____________ 
 
EGLAN YOUNGE, 
 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-00986) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 30, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
______________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent 
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   Appellant Eglan Younge appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 
his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm. 
 Younge, a federal prisoner, was sentenced in 2006 in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York to a term of imprisonment of 210 months on 
convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the criminal 
judgment.  See United States v. Adams, 316 F. App’x 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Despite 
differences in the details recalled by the different witnesses, multiple witnesses testified 
that they saw Younge on the airport tarmac tossing a drug-filled bag into a van, thereby 
allowing the bag to bypass customs.  Evidence was also introduced that showed … 
Younge’s knowledge that his operation had joined with Adams’s operation to effect the 
combined September 2003 shipment.”).  In August, 2010, Younge filed a motion to 
vacate sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in the sentencing court, raising claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  The sentencing court denied the § 2255 motion, 
see Younge v. United States, 2011 WL 837752 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2011), and the 
Second Circuit denied Younge’s request for a certificate of appealability, see C.A. No. 
11-1148.   
 At issue in the instant appeal, Younge filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, in federal court in the District of New Jersey where he is confined.  
Young claimed that the sentencing court erred in denying his § 2255 motion, and erred at 
sentencing in applying a four-level enhancement for his role as a leader or organizer and 
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in finding him responsible for 124 kilograms of cocaine seized in the September, 2003 
shipment.  Younge cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013).  In an order entered on May 16, 2014, the District Court dismissed 
the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that § 2255’s safety valve, see In 
re: Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), did not apply to Younge’s claims. 
 Younge appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Burkey v. 
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (certificate of appealability not required to 
appeal from denial of § 2241 petition).  Our Clerk advised Younge that the appeal was 
subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to 
submit argument in writing and he has done so.  We have considered his submission. 
 We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  The 
District Court properly dismissed Younge’s § 2241 petition because a motion filed under 
§ 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to 
challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 
F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  In certain limited circumstances, a petitioner can seek 
relief under § 2241 if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of his detention, see Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249-51, but § 2255 is not 
inadequate or ineffective simply because the sentencing court does not grant relief on a 
prisoner’s § 2255 motion or the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping requirements, 
8 U.S.C. § 2255(h), for a second § 2255 motion.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. 
Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam).  This “safety valve” applies only 
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where a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for actions 
deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 
(citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).  A § 2241 petition may not be used to relitigate 
ineffective assistance of counsel issues that were rejected as meritless by the sentencing 
court in a § 2255 motion, and may not be used to challenge sentencing enhancements, 
such as those relating to the amount of drugs or one’s role in a drug conspiracy, which 
could have been pursued on direct appeal. 
 In Alleyne, which set forth a new rule of constitutional law, the Supreme Court 
held that a fact that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury 
and found beyond a reasonable doubt.  133 S. Ct. at 2155.  Alleyne is essentially an 
extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  In Apprendi, the Supreme 
Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490.  We held in Okereke that 
“§ 2255 [i]s not inadequate or ineffective for [a prisoner] to raise his Apprendi 
argument,” 307 F.3d at 121, and we see no reason to treat claims brought under Alleyne 
any differently.  We add that we recently held that Alleyne is not retroactive to cases on 
collateral review.  United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2014).  Alleyne 
therefore, does not provide a basis for an appellate court to authorize a second § 2255 
motion, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing Younge’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
